This paper examines the welfare implications of international monetary cooperation using a stylised two-country New Keynesian general equilibrium model of imperfect information. We show that setting a self-oriented monetary policy rule generally leads to welfare gains relative to passive monetary policy even when central banks do not have perfect information about the foreign economy. However, information sharing between central banks in this set-up, by itself, has ambiguous welfare implications. Gains from monetary coordination are largest when productivity shocks are negatively correlated across countries.
Introduction
This paper examines the role of information sharing between central banks in a two-country open economy general equilibrium model of the kind developed by Rogo¤ (2000a, 2002, hereafter OR). The key di¤erence in our analysis is that central banks have imperfect information: they cannot observe productivity shocks abroad. 1 Introducing imperfect information in this way allows us to separate the welfare gains from two di¤erent types of international monetary cooperation
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-gains from information sharing between central banks, and gains from implementing coordinated monetary policy under perfect information. Our results show that in this stylised set-up, information sharing between central banks, by itself, has generally ambiguous welfare implications. On the one hand, better information allows policy makers to respond appropriately to common shocks. But on the other hand, because the better information allows policy makers to respond to a wider set of shocks, this can generate spillover e¤ects which are not necessarily internalised. We also …nd that setting a self-oriented monetary policy rule generates large welfare gains relative to following passive monetary policy, even when monetary authorities do not have full information about the state of the world economy. Gains from international monetary coordination under perfect information are found to be greatest when productivity shocks are negatively correlated across countries.
This paper contributes to the growing literature which explores the welfare implications of international monetary policy cooperation in the 'second generation'macroeconomic model. 2 Using a stylised two-country general equilibrium model consisting of optimising households, monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities, OR (2000a and 2002) have shown that the welfare gains from international monetary coordination are small compared to the gains achieved from countries setting self-oriented monetary policy rules. However, the quantitative estimates of gains from international monetary policy coordination are sensitive to the way various economic frictions -such as …nancial market structure, nominal rigidity, and exchange rate pass-through -are modelled.
Clearly, international monetary coordination is irrelevant in a world of complete …nancial markets since the availability of state-contingent assets eliminates any need for international risk-sharing through monetary policy. Sutherland (2004) shows that the gains from international monetary coordination could be larger under incomplete …nancial markets than under …nancial autarkywhich is assumed in OR's analysis -when the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods are greater than unity. Benigno (2001) also demonstrates that the gains from international monetary coordination are larger when …nancial markets are incomplete and the initial holdings of foreign assets are asymmetric across countries. Canzoneri et al. (2005) show that when di¤erent sectors of the domestic economy are subject to heterogeneous productivity shocks, monetary policy cannot replicate the ‡exible-wage outcome and gains from international monetary coordination are larger than those postulated by OR. Finally, gains from international monetary coordination could also depend non-linearly on …rms'pricing behaviour and the degree of exchange rate pass-through (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2005) . Our analysis focuses on the role of informational frictions, which has not yet been examined in this literature. This paper is also related to the '…rst generation'literature which examines the welfare implications of uncertainty and learning in international monetary cooperation. The '…rst generation' models of international monetary cooperation -represented by inter alia Oudiz and Sachs (1985) -tend to rely on ad hoc assumptions about policy makers'objectives, which typically incorporate an output-in ‡ation trade-o¤. Using such a model, Ghosh and Masson (1991) 'true'transmission mechanism of monetary policy and other shocks. They show that activist policies (either Nash or coordinated) produce large welfare gains relative to passive policies if central banks learn about the 'true'monetary transmission mechanism from observed variables, but they yield large losses in the absence of learning by central banks. Our analysis con…rms in a 'second generation'model that activist monetary policies (Nash or coordinated) dominate passive policies when central banks update their beliefs about foreign productivity shocks after observing domestic shocks. In addition, we examine the impact of information sharing amongst central banks, an issue not explored by Ghosh and Masson.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of a canonical variant of OR's two-country general equilibrium model. We extend this model in Section 3 by introducing imperfect information, and examine the welfare implications by varying the information sets about foreign productivity shocks available to domestic policy makers. We also consider how the degree of correlation between domestic and foreign productivity shocks a¤ects the welfare gains from international monetary cooperation. Section 4 discusses the implications of our results and concludes. Product and labour markets are characterised by monopolistic competition: …rms produce differentiated products using di¤erentiated labour, which is the only input for production. Elasticities of substitution in consumer preference and production function are assumed to be constant. The representative Home agent i's utility U i is a function of consumption C i , real money balances
Monetary policy interdependence under perfect information
where > 0 is the constant coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, L i is the total individual labour supply to both sectors of production, and v 1. The marginal disutility of labour, K, is stochastic, and a high K can be interpreted as a negative country-wide Home productivity shock. The Foreign productivity shock, K , is distributed symmetrically, though not necessarily independently. As we will show later, , v and the degree of correlation between K and K are critical determinants of welfare gains from international monetary policy coordination and information sharing.
In this model, only nominal wages are assumed to be pre-set. The optimal nominal pre-set wage equalises the expected marginal revenue (in consumption units) and the expected marginal disutility from the additional hours worked:
where P is the domestic-currency price index for C H , C F , and C N (P = P T P 1 N and
. The mark-up over the expected marginal disutility of labour, 1 ; re ‡ects the monopolistic competition in the labour market, where is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erenti-ated labour in the production functions. Since the monopolistic …rms facing constant and identical elasticities of demand at home and abroad optimally set price mark-ups over marginal cost, and labour is the only input, the domestic-currency product prices are set equal to constant mark-ups over the …xed nominal wage:
The real exchange rate and the terms of trade are therefore functions of the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of the nominal pre-set wages in the two countries, so that:
Real exchange rate :
Terms of trade :
In each country, the market for non-tradables clears when C N = Y N and C N = Y N , and the market for tradables clear when consumption is equalised across the two countries, C T = C T . This, together with the Cobb-Douglas consumption preferences, implies that Home and Foreign spending measured in units of tradables, de…ned as Z and Z , is always equal, where:
The model is solved by assuming that the monetary and productivity shocks fm; m ; ; g are jointly normally distributed, where lower case letters denote natural logs (e.g. = log K and m = log M ). The Home and Foreign log productivity shocks are assumed to have identical means and variances, such that E = E and 2 = 2 . Further, 'di¤erence'and 'world'productivity shocks, d and w , are de…ned as:
The Home and Foreign monetary policy rules are linear reaction functions to unanticipated 'world'
and 'di¤erence'shocks:
where carets over variables denote the surprise components, e.g. b m = m Em and
The nominal exchange rate depends on relative money supply in the two countries:
Agents'optimisation implies
, so that consumption depends on the real money balance. Since monetary expansion directly increases Home consumption, the total spending Z depends on the 'world'money supply:ẑ =m +m 2
Using the properties of log-normal distributions and the limit ! 0 , the expected utilities of Home and Foreign agents can be expressed as:
where E e U = E e U denotes expected utilities in a ‡exible wage equilibrium. 3 The functions ( ) and ( ) re ‡ect the e¤ect of uncertainties on the expected utilities, and are de…ned as:
where:
and
Thus, the functions w ( ) and d ( ) are the symmetric and asymmetric components of the Home and Foreign expected utilities, respectively. An increase in w ( ) makes both countries better o¤, whereas an increase in d ( ) makes Home better o¤ while making Foreign worse o¤. For example, both Home and Foreign dislike larger volatility in world demand, 2 z ; but whereas Home dislikes a rise in w , which worsens its terms of trade when the world productivity is low, a rise in w bene…ts Foreign as it improves its terms of trade. Since monetary policy a¤ects " and z, it in ‡uences the variance and covariance terms in w ( ) and d ( ).
where ! and are de…ned as:
; and gains from o¤setting nominal wage rigidity and gains from international risk sharing. Monetary policy can o¤set unanticipated productivity shocks so as to achieve the ‡exible-wage equilibrium outcome. It can also be used as an international risk-sharing tool by altering the terms of trade to switch demand towards the country with higher productivity (expenditure switching e¤ect), and by restraining demand when the world productivity is low (world aggregate demand e¤ect). 4 But monetary policy does not eliminate distortions caused by monopolistic competition and therefore can only achieve the 'constrained'optimum, since central banks following pre-speci…ed rules do not o¤set price mark-ups by surprising the agents.
The ‡exible wage equilibrium can be achieved if the monetary policy rules (3) and (4) target
by setting the policy parameters as follows 5 :
In an uncoordinated (or Nash) game, the Home monetary authority sets d and w so as to maximise (7) and the Foreign central bank similarly chooses d and w to maximise (8) . OR show that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, Home and Foreign central banks set the policy parameters such that:
In a cooperative game, the social planner sets d , w , d and w to maximise the world welfare, EV = 
OR de…ne (i) the 'stabilisation gain' as the welfare gain from setting monetary policy that targets ‡exible wage equilibrium, relative to a passive policy (100
(ii) the 'coordination gain'as the welfare gain from moving from ‡exible wage policy to the cooperative equilibrium (100
, where const , f lex , coop are as de…ned in (9) and evaluated under
; coop w ), respectively. These welfare gains are de…ned as percentages of the mean ‡ex-wage output level. Since the Nash equilibrium policy response lies between the ‡exible-wage and cooperative responses, the ratio of (ii)/(i) is the upper bound on the gains to cooperative versus Nash behaviour in rule setting.
Based on simulations which assume that the productivity shocks across countries are uncorrelated ( = 0), OR conclude that under perfect information, such gains from international monetary coordination are small.
Robustness
Here, we brie ‡y examine the robustness of OR's conclusion by simulating the model for di¤erent cross-country correlations of productivity shocks, , while maintaining their calibration for other parameters: = 1:5, = 0:6, and 2 = 2 = 0:02. 6 OR do not prove this proposition in their paper. It is straightforward to prove that when v = 1: If neither central bank can observe the true d and w ; each forms a belief about these after it observes the domestic productivity shock and reacts to its updated 'best guesses'of d and w .
Denoting the Home central bank's updated ('posterior') belief about d and w as e d and e w , and the Foreign central bank's belief as e d and e w , these can be expressed as: 
We assume that each central bank updates its belief about the other country's productivity shock using the least-squares ('best guess') estimation procedure, so that the Home central bank's updated belief about the Foreign shock , conditional on the observed Home productivity shock , is expressed as:
Similarly, the Foreign central bank's conditional expectation about the Home shock E( j ) is:
Using the above expressions, we can rewrite (18) to (21) as: Using (5) and (6), the shocks to the exchange rateẽ and the spending measured in units of tradablesz can be written as:
In a non-cooperative ('Nash') game with imperfect information, the Home and Solving the above for , the imperfect information Nash equilibrium is given by (see Appendix A1
for derivation):
where s v (1 )(1 ), t 1 (1 )(1 ) and u v (1 ). By symmetry, N ash I = N ash I .
Welfare analysis
To conduct welfare analysis, we simulate the model under the following four di¤erent assumptions: Note that N ash P I is (9) evaluated at the perfect information Nash equilibrium, and N ash II is the same evaluated at the imperfect information Nash equilibrium. These de…nitions allow us to separate out the gains from international cooperation into information sharing gains and monetary coordination gains. 7 We begin by exploring the gains from information sharing across countries. We …nd that in certain special cases, the gains from information sharing are zero:
Proposition 1 Under symmetry ( 2 = 2 ), the gains from information sharing are zero if one of the following conditions hold:
Proof. See Appendix A2. Why does information sharing lead to welfare losses? An intuitive explanation is that better information leads to welfare gains if and only if the extra knowledge encourages central bankers to move closer to the cooperative solution; however, there is no guarantee that this will always be the 7 We have chosen to use N ash P I instead of f lex in order to derive the exact size of coordination gains rather than their upper bounds, as OR have done. In practice, replacing N ash P I with f lex , as in OR, has little impact on the quantitative results of our simulations, as the policy rule in the perfect information Nash equilibrium is very close to the policy rule that targets the ‡exible wage equilibrium. case. To illustrate this point, we rewrite the monetary policy rule under perfect information (3) as a function of Home and Foreign productivity shocks:
We …nd that for a range of parameters, In general, the lower v (i.e. the less convex the marginal disutility of labour), the lower the threshold degree of risk aversion at which the globally-optimal Home monetary response to a negative Foreign productivity shock becomes expansionary -i.e. worked does not rise rapidly (v is low), it is globally optimal to shift the world demand to the Home country and make the Home agents work harder when Foreign is hit by a negative productivity shock, rather than contract the world aggregate demand -i.e. the terms of trade consideration dominates the aggregate demand consideration. Conversely, when the marginal disutility from work rises very rapidly (v is large), it is globally optimal to contract the world aggregate demand rather than make the Home agents work harder.
But since the self-oriented policy under perfect information places sub-optimal weight on the terms of trade consideration, the coordinated and Nash solutions deviate from each other when the terms of trade consideration dominates the world demand consideration in setting the coordinated policy rule. Consequently, information sharing gain tends to be negative in these cases (when v is small and is large) while gains from coordination tends to be relatively large (see Figure   4 ). In contrast, when the world aggregate demand consideration dominates the terms of trade consideration in setting the globally optimal policy rule (when v is large and is small), the Nash solution under perfect information is close to the coordinated solution, so that the gains from information sharing are positive -but gains from coordination are low precisely for the same reason.
Gains from setting a self-oriented monetary policy rule under imperfect information are generally positive and large compared to the gains from information sharing and cooperation ( Figure 4 ).
This suggests that countries can potentially achieve large welfare gains from setting clear and timeconsistent policy frameworks even if they do not have perfect information about the world economy.
Conclusions
There are three key …ndings from our analysis. First, setting a self-oriented monetary policy rule which responds to unexpected shocks in a predictable manner leads to welfare gains, even if central banks do not have perfect information about the world economy. Our analysis reinforces the generality of Ghosh and Masson's (1991) conclusions that activist monetary policy rule can achieve a superior outcome relative to a passive policy in a micro-founded 'second generation'model.
Second, we …nd that better information about the state of the world economy has ambiguous welfare implications in this stylised model. On the one hand, better information allows policy makers to respond appropriately to common shocks; but on the other hand, it could also encourage them to adjust policies to their advantage at the expense of hurting the foreign economies. Third, our simulations show that gains from international monetary coordination under perfect information are greatest when productivity shocks are negatively correlated between countries. However, the total gains from international cooperation -involving both information sharing and implementing coordinated policies -are nevertheless relatively small.
We thus conclude that better information, by itself, does not necessarily guarantee Paretoimproving behaviour by central banks. This suggests that international dialogue would be more e¤ective if supported by institutions which encourage central banks to take into account the policy spillovers on the basis of better information. However, the quantitative gains from information sharing are likely to depend on the speci…c assumptions of the model. First, achieving the ‡exible-wage equilibrium through monetary policy in our model requires information about domestic shocks only, so that imperfect information about foreign productivity shocks does not a¤ect the central banks'ability to achieve the ‡exible-wage equilibrium. This is likely to be an important reason why information sharing gains (or losses) are quantitatively small in our simulations. Our conjecture is that the gains from information sharing could be larger if production by domestic …rms relies on imported inputs produced by foreign labour, such that achieving the ‡exible-wage equilibrium requires information about foreign productivity shocks. Second, our result that information sharing and coordination gains are small relative to stabilisation gains may change once we relax the assumption of perfect exchange rate pass-through. Corsetti and Pesenti's (2005) analysis shows that the welfare gains from international coordination depend non-linearly on the degree of exchange rate pass-through, and thus raises the possibility that the gains from information sharing in our model could be larger if the exchange rate pass-through is less than perfect. These are possible avenues for future research.
Inserting the above, and de…ning s v (1 Solving for , we obtain N ash I as in (31).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The gains from information sharing is zero if N ash P = N ash I or equivalently if N ash P N ash I = 0, where these are de…ned as: 
